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THE

TENDER OFFER REGULATION BATTLE CONTINUES:

SHOULD STATES REGULATE ONLY LOCAL CoMPANIEs?
Proxy solicitations' and cash tender offers2 are two techniques frequently
used to transfer corporate control between investors. In the past two decades,
the tender offer has emerged as the primary transfer method largely because
of its relative speed, low cost, and efficiency. 3 Until 1968, tender offers were
essentially unregulated. The tender offer tactic did not exist when the federal

securities laws were enacted as part of the 1930's New Deal legislation.
Consequently, neither the Securities Act of 19334 nor the Securities Exchange
Act of 19345 specifically regulated tender offers. In the 1960's, however,
tender offers increased dramatically, as did complaints of actual and potential
abuses of the tactic. 6 Congress responded by amending the 1934 Act with
the passage of the Williams Act 7 which provides both offering and target
companies with basic guidelines. At the same time, states began enacting
their own tender offer laws, variously termed takeover bid disclosure acts,8
investor protection acts, 9 or tender offer acts.' 0

State tender offer laws are complex and often contradictory which in turn
cause compliance problems for potential bidders. State statutes arguably
conflict with the federal tender offer provisions," thus giving rise to questions

1. Proxy contests typically occur when two or more parties seek shareholder proxies
authorizing the solicitor to cast the shareholder's vote at the corporation's annual or quarterly
meeting. Proxy solicitation is regulated by § 14 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934,
codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78n(a)-(c) (1982). For a more complete discussion of proxy regulation,
see generally, L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SEcuRrIs REGULATION 509-67 (2d ed. 1983); E.
ARANoW & H. EINHORN, PROXY CONTESTS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 89-263 (2d ed. 1968)
(discussing proxy contests as a means of acquiring corporate control).
2. A cash tender offer is a public offer inviting all shareholders of a target firm to sell
their shares to the acquiring firm for a specified price, usually within certain time limits. The
price quoted usually includes a substantial premium over the current stock market price. Under
an exchange offer, in contrast, the tendering shareholders receive stock in the acquiring firm,
rather than cash payments for the stock tendered. See Jarrell & Bradley, The Economic Effects
of Federal and State Regulations of Tender Offers, 23 J. LAW & ECON. 371, 371 n.1 (1980);
Note, Commerce Clause Limitations Upon State Regulation of Tender Offers, 47 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1133, 1133-34 (1974).
3. Note, supra note 2, at 1134.
4. 15 U.S.C. § 77a-77aa (1982).
5. Id. § 78a-78kk.
6. See E. ARANow & H. EINHORN, TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 64-66 (1973);
Warren, Developments in State Takeover Regulation: MITE and Its Aftermath, 40 Bus. LAW.
671, 673 (1985); Note, supra note 2, at 1136-39.
7. Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 464 (1968) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d), 78m(e),
78n(d)-78n(O (1982).
8. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 45.57.020 (1980); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 409.515 (Vernon 1979).
9. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-5-101 to -112 (1984 & Supp. 1985).
10. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 36-460 (West Supp. 1985).
11. See infra notes 64-131 and accompanying text.

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 60:721

of the constitutionality of state laws. 2 In Edgar v. MITE Corp.,I3 the United
States Supreme Court held that the Illinois Business Takeover Act' 4 violated
the commerce clause of the Constitution. 5 Because MITE generated six
different opinions, many questions were raised and left unanswered. The
most important question, for purposes of this Note, is the extent to which
6
states are still allowed to regulate the tender offer process.'
In February of 1983, the Securities and Exchiange Commission (SEC)
established the Advisory Committee on Tender Offers (Committee) to examine tender offers and other control acquisition techniques. The Committee
was directed to recommend any changes it considered necessary for improving
the current regulatory system. " After reviewing a range of acquisition techniques-including proxy contests, cash tender offers, exchange tender offers,' 8 and front-end loaded or two-tier bids' 9-the Committee suggested
limiting state regulation to takeovers involving local companies. 20 The Committee did not specify what constituted a local company, but did recommend
several elements that could identify a local company for regulatory purposes.
These factors include: the percentage of voting shares held within the state
of incorporation; the absence of a listing on a national stock exchange; a
specified trading volume for stock held by nonaffiliated shareholders, and
an aggregate market value ceiling for such stock.2 ' The factors are helpful
as a starting point for defining a local company, but are far from definitive.
Equally as important as listing the factors is the provision of reasons for
selecting each particular factor. The Committee failed to do so, leaving it
to each interested party to speculate on the wisdom and rationale of the
Committee's suggestions.
As a basis for analyzing the committee recommendations regarding the
objectives and role of takeover legislation, this Note first examines the
Williams Act requirements. The Note discusses common state regulatory
provisions, comparing them with existing federal provisions and assessing
the constitutionality of the state statutes. After evaluating several committee

12. Id.
13. 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
14. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 121-1/2, §§ 137.51 to .70 (Supp. 1982) (repealed 1983).
15. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8.
16. Although state statutes differ in some respects from each other, many provisions of the
Illinois Act found objectionable in MITE are similar to those in other states' laws. With the
invalidation of the Illinois law, the constitutionality of other states' tender offer laws is also
questionable.
17. Advisory Committee on Tender Offers, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission,
Report of Recommendations, 1 (July 8, 1983) [hereinafter cited as Advisory Committee Report].
18. See supra note 2.
19. Two-tier offers are tender offers followed by mergers or other transactions in which
greater consideration is paid in the tender offer stage than in the merger stage, which is designed
to eliminate minority shareholders. Survey, Annual Review of FederalSecurities Regulation,
40 Bus. LAW. 159, 202 (1984).
20. Advisory Committee Report, supra note 17, Recommendation 9(a) at 17.
21. Id.at 17 n.17.
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recommendations, this Note concludes by considering whether a definition
of a local company is in fact necessary, and if so, what such a definition
should encompass.
I.

THE WILLIAMS ACT

The market approach22 to investor protection is the key to the Williams
Act. Requiring extensive precommencement disclosure ensures that current
shareholders will have sufficient information to decide whether to tender
their shares. "3 Disclosure also enables potential investors to make fully
informed decisions on whether to engage in open market trading in the target
company stock.24 Under the market approach, the federal government does
not examine the merits of a proposed tender offer. The government, through
the SEC, merely reviews the adequacy of the disclosure, ordering further
disclosure when necessary to clarify or to supplement the revealed information.
There are five main categories of information required to be disclosed.
First, the information must specify the offeror's identity, background, address and citizenship, as well as the nature of the offeror's beneficial ownership, if any. 25 Next, the disclosure must reveal the sources and the amount
of funds or other consideration used to purchase the tendered shares. 26 Along
with the sources and the amount of funds, the financial data must also state
whether any of the purchase price represents funds borrowed specifically for
27
the tender offer.
The third classification requires the offeror to disclose his shareholdings
and any rights he has to acquire additional shares. 28 The fourth category
requires the bidder to set forth any plans it has that involve liquidating the
target company, selling its assets, merging it with another company, or
making any other major business or structural changes. 29 The final category
requires the bidder to list and describe any contract or agreement he has
made concerning the acquisition and disposition of the firm's securities. 0
Another way the Williams Act protects investors is by relieving the time
pressures associated with tender offers. This in turn provides the investor
with an opportunity to fully evaluate the offer. One way the time pressure
is reduced is by granting shareholders a right of withdrawal. Tendering
shareholders may withdraw their shares within seven days of the original

22. Comment, AMCA International Corp. v. Krouse: The Saga of State Takeover-Act
Constitutionality Continues, 10 CAP. U.L. REv. 129 (1980).
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1)(A) (1982).
26. Id. § 78m(d)(1)(B).
27. Id.

28. Id. § 78m(d)(1)(D).
29. Id. § 78m(d)(1)(C).
30. Id. § 78m(d)(1)(E).
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publication of the offer, 3 and again after sixty days from the original

publication date.12 Another shareholder right that alleviates time pressures
is the pro-rata take-up requirement. Shareholders do not need to rush to

tender their shares on a first-come, first-taken basis. In the event of oversubscription, the offeror must purchase the tendered shares on a pro-rata
basis. 3 The final safety-valve is the requirement that all tendering shareholders receive the same purchase price. Should the offering price change

during the course of the offer, shareholders who tendered early are treated
the same as those who tender after the price change occurs.3
Taken as a whole, then, the Williams Act protects investors by requiring
disclosure of information vital to the decision-making process2 5 Shareholders
need a basis for choosing whether to remain associated with the firm after
new management and a new controlling shareholder group have taken charge.
Shareholders are better equipped to make this decision if they know the
identity of the offeror, its financing, and its plans for the company.16 Relieving the time pressures inherent in a tender offer allows investors to avoid
making hurried and ill-considered decisions that are not readily reversible.
II.
A.

STATE REGULATION

A Comparison of State and Federal Provisions

Reaction to the Williams Act was generally favorable after its passage in
1968. State legislators, however, still believed that tender offers posed problems for their constituents, problems, such as the corporate raider, 7 that
are inadequately addressed by the Williams Act. As a result, thirty-six states

have enacted tender offer laws since the Williams Act was passed. 8

31. Id. § 78n(d)(5). This has been extended from seven to 15 days under the SEC's rulemaking ability. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-7(a)(1) (1984).
32. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(5) (1982).
33. Id. § 78n(d)(6).
34. Id. § 78n(d)(7).
35. Target companies also have disclosure duties so that shareholders will be fully informed.
For the target's disclosure requirements, see 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-l to -4 (1985).
36. 113 CONG. REC. 24,664, 24,665 (1967).
37. The corporate raider strips the company of its assets and pockets the proceeds from
their sale, leaving the company nothing more than a shell which quickly collapses.
38. Thirty-seven states have enacted tender offer laws but Virginia passed its law immediately
before the enactment of the Williams Act. Many of these state laws have been repealed in the
wake of the MITE decision, supra notes 13, 16. See also infra notes 86-103 and accompanying
text. The thirty-six statutes are: ALASKA STAT. §§ 45.57.010 to .120 (1980); ARK. STAT. ANN.
§§ 67-1264 to -1264.14 (1980); COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 11-51.5-101 to -108 (Supp. 1982) (repealed
1984); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-456 to -468 (West Supp. 1985); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§ 203 (1983 & Supp. 1984); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 517.35 to .363(West Supp. 1978) (repealed
1979); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 14-6-1 to 14-6-15 (1982 & Supp. 1983); HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 417
E-1 to -15 (1976 & Supp. 1984) (repealed effective 1986); IDAHO CODE §§ 30-1501 to -1513
(1980 & Supp. 1985); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 121-1/2, §§ 137.51 to .70 (Supp. 1982) (repealed
1983); IND. CODE §§ 23-2-3.1-0.5 to -11 (1982); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 502.211 to .215 (West
Supp. 1985); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-1276 to -1284 (1981 & Supp. 1984); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.
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The claimed rationale of state tender offer regulation is the same as that

of the Williams Act: investor protection. 9 State regulation differs from
federal regulation in several important aspects. First, disclosure under state
laws is generally more extensive than that under the Williams Act. The Ohio
Takeover Act, 40 for example, requires much of the same disclosure that the
federal act demands. Ohio, however, extends beyond the federal provisions
by ordering the disclosure of what is termed "complete information" regarding the organization and operations of the offeror . 4 This broad definition of complete information may trigger the charge by the tender offer
opponent of inadequate disclosure. Such an exclusion of information may
also be found by a court to be a false
and misleading act, which could
42
subject the offeror to heavy penalties.

A second difference between federal and state regulations lies in the timing
of the disclosure. Federal disclosure occurs at the commencement of the
tender offer, when the offeror files a Schedule 13D 41 form with the SEC.
Many states, on the other hand, mandate disclosure prior to the effective
date of the offer. The respective states demand notification and disclosure
anywhere from ten 44 to sixty45 days before the offer is effective. Under state
statutes, furthermore, only the bidder is required to reveal information;
under the Williams Act, both the target company and the bidder have
46
disclosure obligations.
§§ 292.560 to .630 (Bobbs-Merrill 1981 & Supp. 1983) (repealed 1984); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 51:1500 to :1512 (West Supp. 1985); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13 §§ 801-817 (1981 & Supp.
1984-85); MD. CoRPs. & Ass'Ns. CODE ANN. §§ 11-901 to -908 (1985); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch.
IIOC §§ 1-13 (Michie/Law. Co-op. Supp. 1985); MICH. ComA,. LAWS ANN. §§ 451.901 to .908

(West Supp. 1985);

MINN. STAT. ANN.

§§ 80B.01 to .13 (West Supp. 1984); Miss.

CODE ANN.

§§ 75-72-101 to -121 (Supp. 1984); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 409.500 to .565 (Vernon 1979 & Supp. 1985);
NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 21-2401 to -2417 (1977) (repealed); NEV. REv. STAT. §§ 78.376 to .3778 (1979)
(amended 1983); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 421-A:1 to :15 (Supp. 1979) (repealed 1981); N.J. STAT.
ANN. §§ 49:5-1 to -19 (West Supp. 1985); N.Y. Bus. CoRaP. LAw §§ 1600-1614 (McKinney Supp.
1984-85); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 78B-1 to -11 (1981); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1707.041 (1985);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, §§ 71-85 (Purdon Supp. 1985); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 35-2-10 to -130
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1984); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 47-32-1 to -48 (1984); TENN. CODE
ANN. §§ 48-2-101 to -114 (1984); Texas Administrative Guidelines for Minimum Standards in
Tender Offers §§ 065.15.00.100 to .800, reprintedin 3 BLuE SKY L. REP. (CCH)
55,671-55,682;
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 61-4-1 to -13 (1978) (repealed 1983); WIs. STAT. ANN. §§ 552.01-.25 (West
Supp. 1985).
Virginia's statute can be found at VA. CODE §§ 13.1-528 to -541 (1978 & Supp. 1982).
39. Although this is the claimed rationale, it is questionable whether this is in fact the real
rationale. For a further discussion of this issue, see infra notes 108-17 and accompanying text.
40. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1707.041 (1985).
41. Id. § 1707.041(B)(3)(b)-(g). For a comparison of the Ohio and Williams Acts, see
Comment, supra note 22, at 137-41.
42. The definition of a false and misleading act is purposefully broad so as to not exclude
any potentially fraudulent acts.
43. Schedule 13D of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-101 (1983).
44. E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 67-1264.2(5) (1980).
45. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203(a) (1983) (from 20 to 60 days pre-effective
notice). Apparently some state legislators have concluded that their pre-effective notification
period is too long, and have stricken these clauses. See, e.g., HAWAII REV. STAT. § 417E-3(f)
(1976) (repealed effective July, 1986).
46. See supra notes 23, 25-30, 35 and accompanying text.
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The SEC has recognized the incompatibility of state and federal disclosure

timing. In a 1979 release accompanying proposed changes to the Williams
Act, the SEC stated:
[Tihe conflict between Rule 14d-2(b) and such state statutes is so direct
and substantial as to make it impossible to comply with both sets of
requirements as they presently exist . . . the Commission . .. believes
that the state takeover statutes presently in effect frustrate the operations
and purposes of the Williams Act.

... .4

Frustration of the Williams Act's operations and purposes is an important
element in assessing the constitutionality of state statutes. This area will be
48
examined in greater detail in a subsequent section of this Note.
State jurisdictional claims are premised on a substantially different basis
than that of federal regulation. The Williams Act applies to transactions,
that is, securities purchases and the making of bids. The Act is triggered by

the attainment of a certain percentage of stock ownership. 49 Most states
claim jurisdiction not upon any specific securities transactions involving state
residents or occurring within state borders, but upon the status of the target
company. Target companies are broadly defined as including those corpo-

rations incorporating within the state; 50 locating the principal place of business within state borders; 51 or having a substantial amount of assets within
2

the state..
Companies either employing a given level of their total work force within

the state53 or having a certain percentage 6f shareholders who are state

residents are similarly subject to state jurisdictional claims. 4 State 'tender
offer statutes apply as well to companies that fit into several of the previously
mentioned categories.
Registration of the firm's equity securities under federal securities laws or
state blue sky laws serves as a final jurisdictional basis.5 6 This basis assumes

47. SEC Release No. 34-16384, reprinted in [1979-80 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 82,373 at 82,584 (Nov. 19, 1979).
48. See infra notes 78-103 and accompanying text.
49. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) (1982).
50. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203 (1983); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 73 (Purdon
Supp. 1984); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 67-1264(6) (1980).
51. See, e.g., MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 11OC § I (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1985); MICH. COMP.
LAws ANN. § 451.904(1) (West Supp. 1985).
52. See, e.g., ALAsKA STAT. § 45.57.110(4) (1980); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203(c)(2) (1983);
IDAHO CODE § 30-1501(6) (1980 & Supp. 1985); IND. CODE § 23-2-3.1-10) (1982); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 17-1276(A) (1981); Ky.. REV. STAT. ANN. § 272.560(1) (Bobbs-Merrill 1981 & Supp.
1983) (declared unconstitutional in Esmark Inc. v. Strode, 639 S.W.2d 768 (Ky. 1982)); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 49:5-2m (West Supp. 1985).
53. See, e.g., LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 51:1500.1(13) (West Supp. 1985).
54. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2420(4) (1983); S.C. CODE ANN. § 35-2-20(5) (Law Coop. Supp. 1984).
55. Most states have a catch-all phrase covering several of these factors, either singly or
together. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 49:5-2m (West Supp. 1985).
56. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 30-1501(6) (1980); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 80B.01(9) (West Supp.
1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 47-32-3 (1983).
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that in voluntarily submitting to the detailed informational requirements of
the registration process, the company has implicitly agreed to accept the
jurisdiction of the state.17 Relying on a status basis for jurisdiction rather
than on a transactions basis brings the state dangerously close to regulating
matters in which it has no legitimate regulatory interest because these matters
58
occur outside of the state's boundaries.
Another major difference between state and federal tender offer laws is
that the states usually provide for some determination of the offer's merits.
A state official, such as the secretary of state or the securities commissioner,
often can initiate the hearing at his own option, as well as upon the request
of the target company.5 9 The hearing, often termed a "fairness hearing,"
may concentrate on the extent and content of the disclosure as well as upon
the equality of the offering to all offereesA0 If the state official finds either
the disclosure or the offer's terms to be inadequate, the offer can be halted
6
or delayed pending modification. '
If the target company's management accepts the offer, usually no such
hearing occurs. If, on the other hand, the offer is rejected, the offeror will
be forced to defend its bid in the fairness hearing. The differing state and
federal procedures reflect the concept of fiduciary duty evaluation. In its
position as the representative of the company's owners, that is, the shareholders, management has the duty of analyzing the substance of the offer
and actively opposing it if the terms are considered unacceptable. 62 The
fiduciary duty concept of state law contrasts sharply with the federal emphasis
on the market approach, under which the shareholders are presumed to be
6
capable of evaluating the worth of the tender offer. 1
Differences between state and federal tender offer provisions prompt debates over the constitutionality of the state statutes. Two main theories of
state law unconstitutionality have been advanced: preemption by the federal
statutes and interference with interstate commerce to such a degree as to be
untenable. In addressing each of the arguments, this Note will examine the
importance of the different state and federal provisions.

57. This is similar to arguments supporting long-arm jurisdiction and service of process in
cases involving parties who reside in different states. See infra note 115. It has not been asserted
that this basis of state tender offer jurisdiction violates the minimum contacts test of International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). Such a discussion is outside the scope
of this Note.
58. See infra notes 106-31 and accompanying text.
59. See, e.g., Oaio REv. CODE ANN. § 1707.041(B)(1) (Page 1985).
60. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 23-2-3.1-7(a) (1982).
61. Id. For further discussion of a similar provision, see infra notes 95-98 and accompanying
text.
62. See Comment, supra note 22, at 146.
63. See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text.
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Constitutionality of State Takeover Laws

1. Preemption and the Supremacy Clause
The supremacy clause gives federal laws precedence over state laws if both
state and federal laws cover a subject. 4 Where the state law directly contradicts the federal law, the former will automatically be invalidated. Where
the two systems do not directly conflict, a more indirect form of analysis
is required to assess state law constitutionality. Pennsylvania v. Nelson65
provides a trio of broad guidelines for resolving questions of constitutionality. One standard is that a reasonable inference of congressional preemption
arises out of the pervasiveness of the federal regulations. 66 A second principle
is that if the federal interest is so dominant that "the federal system [must]
be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject," 67the
state law must be found invalid. The final guideline declares that if the
enforcement of state laws would present a serious danger of conflict with
the administration
of a federal program, the state laws will be stricken as
68
unconstitutional.
The Williams Act does not expressly invalidate existing state tender offer
legislation, nor does it specifically prohibit any future state efforts to regulate
tender offers. Section 28 of the 1934 Act states in part that "[niothing in
this chapter shall affect the jurisdiction of the securities commission ... of
any state .. . insofar as it does not conflict with the provisions of this

chapter or the rules and regulationsthereunder."'I9 Some commentators claim
this savings clause70 demonstrates a congressional intent to allow states to
regulate takeovers in any manner state officials deem appropriate. 71 Other

64. U.S. CONST. art. VI. Article VI provides, in pertinent part:
This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
65. 350 U.S. 497 (1955).
66. Id. at 502 (citing Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1946)).
67. 350 U.S. at 504 (citing Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1946)).
68. Id. at 505.

69. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb (1982) (emphasis added).
70. The terms "savings clause," "saving," and "savings effect" refer to the idea that §
28 "saves" the state statutes from being preempted by federal tender offer regulations. See
generally Note, Preemption and the Constitutionality of State Tender Offer Legislation, 54
NOTRE DAME LAW. 725, 731-32 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Note, Preemption and Constitutionality]; Note, supra note 2, at 1168.
71. One observer suggests that § 28, "although not dispositive ... raises an inference that
Congress intend[s] to supplement rather than to preempt state regulation." Note, Preemption
and Constitutionality,supra note 70, at 731. This view is shared by another commentator, who
states that in passing the Williams Act, Congress acted to ensure investors would have some
minimal level of protection in chaotic tender offer contexts. "Congress had no intention of
preventing the states from expanding some of these protections by providing for advance notice,
or additional disclosures or even fair, just, and equitable tests with respect to takeover offers .. " TENTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES REGULATION 311 (Fleischer, Lipton &
Stevenson eds. 1979). The commentators imply that if Congress had intended the Williams Act
to preempt state takeover statutes, the Act would have included a passage directly stating that
position.
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legal scholars declare that the better view of section 28 is that it saves only
the state blue sky legislation existing at the time the 1934 Act was passed.
Because tender offers are such a new phenomenon, there was no tender
offer regulation in 1934; hence, state controls over tender offers should not
be protected by section 28.72 The final view of section 28 is that it has no
real savings effect; instead, the clause merely restates the supremacy clause
and reemphasizes its applicability to tender offer legislation.7 a Section 28
under this interpretation is neutral, neither saving nor preempting state tender
offer regulation. This neutrality reflects the Williams Act's guiding philosophy of protecting the investor while remaining neutral towards the bidder
and the target company.
Under the first Nelson guideline, the Williams Act arguably could be
considered so pervasive that it leaves no room for concurrent state regulation.
The scope of the congressional deliberations, combined with the restatement
of federal supremacy in section 28, points toward the existence of a comprehensive federal scheme for regulating tender offers. By definition, this
comprehensive scheme covers all issues deemed important in the tender offer
context. The reason why certain state provisions have no Williams Act
equivalent is that Congress considered such provisions neither necessary nor
desirable. As a result, Congress left no room for state statutes to supplement
the federal regulations.
The pervasiveness argument ignores the fact that the Williams Act follows
the general pattern of other federal securities law provisions permitting
concurrent systems of state regulation. 74 Since states traditionally have been
allowed to regulate the securities industry despite existing federal regulation,
there cannot be said to be an exclusive, dominant role of federal securities
legislation. 75 It is therefore "inappropriate to infer that the Williams Act
precludes state regulation of tender offers. ' 76 Simultaneous regulation of

72. Note, Preemption and Constitutionality, supra note 70, at 731. That author discounts
this argument as not justifying a finding of congressional intention to preempt state tender
offer regulation. He claims that no basis exists for predicting the scope of a savings clause
upon a time element. "No decision or analysis of the legislative history of the 1934 Act has
ever suggested that the savings clause was meant to be only retrospective. Concurrent regulation
of all aspects of securities seems to have been clearly contemplated by Congress." Id. at 732.
Accordingly, the policy arguments against a declaration of preemption "have nothing to do
with a time restriction on the scope of a savings clause .... The relevant policy factors are
time-independent, and, hence, little or nothing in the way of advancing those policy factors is
gained by a restrictive interpretation of the scope of the savings clause." Id.
73. This position is particularly evident in E. ARAiow, H. EinHoaN & G. BERLSTEIN,
DEvELOPMENTS IN TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPOATE CONTROL 225-29 (1977).
74. These provisions are: 15 U.S.C. § 79u (1982) (Public Utility Holding Company Act of
1935); 15 U.S.C. § 77zzz (1982) (Trust Indenture Act of 1939); 15 U.S.C. § 80a-49 (1982)
(Investment Company Act of 1940); 15 U.S.C. § 80b-18a (1982) (Investment Advisors Act of
1940). The provision in the Investment Advisors Act was added in the 1960 amendments, Pub.
L. No. 86-750, § 16, 74 Stat. 888 (1960). See Bartell, Federal-StateRelations under the Federal
Securities Code, 32 VAND. L. REv. 457, 463 n.28 (1979).
75. SEC Release No. 34-16384, reprintedin [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP.
(CCH) 82,373 at 82,584 (Nov. 19, 1979).
76. Note, Securities Law and the Constitution: State Tender Offer Statutes Reconsidered,
88 YALE L.J. 510, 520 (1979).
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securities transactions under federal and state laws demonstrates that the
second Nelson guideline concerning the existence of a dominant federal
interest is not met, just as the pervasiveness criterion was not. While there
are strong federal interests in policing the securities industry and in maintaining a national securities market, there is no general rule that these interests
are reserved for exclusive federal control. 77 The lack of federal legislation
taking a definitive stand on excluding state regulation reinforces the absence
of a dominant federal interest precluding the enforcement of state laws.
The third preemption argument, that state laws present a serious conflict
with the administration of federal regulations, is the most plausible basis
for invalidating state takeover laws. A primary example of the serious conflict
is the difference in disclosure regulations. The additional disclosure required
by state statutes represents a substantial burden on the offeror, a burden
7
that may be of little benefit to the shareholder solicited to tender his holdings. 1
To the extent that state and federal disclosure provisions overlap, no needs
are fulfilled by sending the shareholders and target management two sets of
the same information.
Disclosure surpassing the Williams Act requirements may be counterproductive. The informational overload has two possible adverse consequences: the shareholders either reduce the amount of material that they
read, or they stop reading it altogether. Neither alternative accomplishes the
goal of improving the shareholder's decision-making abilities. In Great Western United Corp. v. Kidwell,79 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals declared
that Idaho's additional disclosure requirement "reduce[d] the utility of federally required disclosure and produce[d] an obstacle to the accomplishment
of the federal objective to enable investors to make an informed choice
about a tender offer.'"'s The appellate court affirmed the district court
holding that Idaho's takeover act was unconstitutional.

77. The interest involved here differs greatly from the federal interest present in earlier
cases declaring state laws preempted by federal legislation. Foreign affairs and national security
are clearly areas where the federal interest is paramount, as evidenced by Supreme Court
decisions in Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941) and Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S.
497 (1956), respectively. See generally Note, supra note 76.
78. While the state-ordered disclosures are more comprehensive than those demanded by
the Williams Act, the disclosures "probably are of little benefit to the shareholders, for the
information required to be disclosed may not be significant to them, and may obscure the
relevant disclosures." E. ARANow, H. EINHORN & G. BERLSTEIN, supra note 73, at 219-20.

This assertion is similar to those often made regarding the effectiveness and extent of disclosure
for the issuance of new securities under the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa
(1982). Critics of the 1933 Act disclosure rules claim that the information revealed is overwhelming in its detail, unrealistic in severely limiting the amount of "soft information," such
as forecasts and plans allowed to be revealed, and minimally useful because the information
is stale and the market adjusted to that information when it was first revealed. See generally
Kripke, The SEC, The Accountants, Some Myths and Some Realities, 45 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1151
(1970).
79. 577 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1978), rev'd on venue grounds sub nom. Leroy v. Great
Western United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979).
80. 577 F.2d at 1281.
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State requirements of additional disclosure are typically favored by objects
of hostile takeover bids. A target management hostile to the offer often uses
the additional information as a powerful weapon to fight the bidder. The
more detailed that state regulations are, and the more material that is
disclosed, the more opportunities the target has to criticize the disclosures

and to obtain injunctions delaying the offer. The extra time needed to gather
and disseminate the disclosure material, and the preeffectiveness notification,
combine to delay the commencement of the offer, thus giving the target
additional time to structure a defense.
Preeffective notification allows the target an advantage in planning and
executing its defensive strategies. 81 Tender offer success rates are low, 82 in
part because of the difficulties inherent in persuading large number's of
geographically dispersed shareholdersI to make significant investment 'decisions in the relatively short time that/an offer is outstanding.8 3 A successful
tender offer, furthermore, is highly dependent upon the advantage of surprise
in announcing the offer. Once word is out that an offer is contemplated,
the immediate reactions of the stock market and of the target company's
management increase the offeror's 'difficulty in successfully concluding the
offer." By giving target companies a defensive advantage, state regulations

conflict with the avowed intentions of the Williams Act sponsors, who stated
that "extreme care" was taken to "avoid tipping the scales either in favor
of management or in favor of the person making the takeover bids." 85
State-sanctioned merit hearings also seriously conflict with the administration of the federal laws, giving target managements another advantage. The
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals found this advantage objectionable in

81. See generally Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982); MITE Corp. v. Dixon, 633
F.2d 486 (1980); Great Western United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 2356 (1978). See also E.
ARN.ow, H. EINHORN & G.BERUIrETN, supra note 73; Note, supra note 2; Note, supra note
76.
82. One study tabulated that in the decade 1956-1966, only 29 of 83 contested bids were
successful. Hayes & Taussig, Tactics of Cash Takeover Bids, 45 HARv. Bus. REv. 135, 137,
139 (Mar.-Apr. 1967).
83. See generally E. ARANow, H. EINHORN & G. BEtuSTEIN, supra note 73; Easterbrook
& Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94
HARv. L. REv. 1161 (1981); Hayes & Taussig, supra note 82.
84. The increased difficulty facing the bidder is that the target company will have had time
to set up its defensive strategy. One common defense tactic is a solicitation by incumbent
management of a "white knight," who comes into the tender offer scene with a competing
tender bid. A second defense strategy is to merge the potential target with a corporation selected
by the target company management. Another device used by the target management is a
repurchase of its own shares to lower the number of outstanding shares. With fewer shares
outstanding, the market price of the remaining outstanding shares will rise; the shareholders
consequently have little incentive to tender their shares. Other transactions which enhance the
desirability of the stock in the eyes of the shareholders, such as declaring stock splits or
extending dividend increases, are also possible with the early warning provided target managements by the preeffective filing. See generally E. AA .Now, H. ErNioRN & G. BERLSTEIN, supra
note 73, at 234-74; Note, supra note 2, at 1136.
85. 113 CONG. REc. 24,663, 24,664 (1967) (statement of Sen. Williams).
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MITE Corp. v. Dixon,16 where it affirmed the district court's decision holding
the Illinois Business Takeover Act 7 unconstitutional on both supremacy and
commerce clause grounds. In addition to requiring a pre-offering filing and
a twenty day waiting period, the Illinois statute provided for a hearing if
requested by one of three different groups: the secretary of state, a majority
of the outside directors of the target firm, or investors holding ten percent
of the target's outstanding shares."'
Reviewing the lower court's decision, the court of appeals declared that
by relying "upon its Secretary of State's judgment rather than upon investors'
own judgment after full disclosure of the relevant facts, [Illinois'] regulatory
scheme stands in fundamental conflict with federal law and is therefore
unconstitutional. '8 9 Noting that the interests of the target management may
differ from those of the company's shareholders, the court of appeals stated:
[A]nything which suggests delegation to management of the right to call
hearings (of potentially indefinite duration) does not further the congressional goal of insuring freedom of action of informed stockholders...
[i]n general, any delegation of the right to call hearings to private parties
potentially (but realistically) subject to management influence or direction
must be regarded as suspect."

Although the court of appeals and the district court considered this conflict
sufficient to constitute a basis for federal preemption of state tender offer
regulation under the third Nelson criterion, the United States Supreme Court
did not agree. In Edgar v. MITE Corp.,91 Justice White's plurality opinion
briefly mentioned the lower courts' positions and simply agreed with the
prior reasoning. 92 Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun joined in the
plurality opinion; Justices Stevens, Powell and O'Connor declared the case
controlled by the commerce clause violations. 93 The dissenters, Justices Marshall, Brennan and Rehnquist, never reached the question of preemption,
94
as they would have dismissed the case as being moot.
The plurality opinion in MITE also considered the built-in delay features
of the Illinois Act to be a source of conflict with federal regulations.95
Although the Illinois law permitted the secretary of state to call a merit

86. 633 F.2d 486 (7th Cir. 1980), aff'd sub nom. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624

(1982).

87. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 121-1/2 §§ 137.51 to .70 (Supp. 1982) (repealed 1983).
88. Id. at § 137.54(B), § 131.57(A).
89. MITE, 633 F.2d at 494.
90. Id. at 495 (footnote omitted).
91. 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
92. Id. at 639-40 (opinion of White, J.).
93. Justices Stevens and Powell expressly disagreed with the preemption holding. 457 U.S.
at 646-47, 655. Justice O'Connor stated it was unnecessary to reach the preemption argument.

Id. at 655.

94. 457 U.S. at 655, 664 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 667
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).

95. 457 U.S. at 636-39 (opinion of White, J.).
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hearing, it did not set a deadline for completion of the hearing.9 6 The
secretary of state was required to render a decision within fifteen days after
the conclusion of the hearing, but he could extend that period without
limitation.9 7 The tender offer could not proceed until the hearing was over
and the decision had been rendered.
Delay presents a problem to each side in the takeover because it is costly
and frustrating. Some bidders will face competitive offers arising as a result
of the disclosure. The competition may generate a higher price for the shares
eventually tendered; conversely, competition may cause the original bidder
Co drop his offer, after which the rival bidder may or may not decide to
continue his offer. Delays may also cause potential bidders to lower the
initial bid price, thus lowering the final price paid, or may cause corporate
officers to refrain from making any offer at all. 99
Target company shareholders in any event bear the risk of a tender offer.
If the offer succeeds, shareholders often will receive a lower price than if
there were no state tender offer regulations. If the offer fails, investors
receive a minimal net increase in the price of their holdings, if in fact the
market value rises at all.' ° Delays caused by the fairness hearing buy time
for the target company, but at the cost of increased legal and accounting
fees. The shareholders, as owners of the firm, ultimately pay for these
additional expenses. In general, therefore, delays may harm shareholders as
well as benefit them.
The federal interest in regulating tender offers is the protection of the
investing public. Most discussions of the protective purpose focus solely
upon the need of the target company investors to be fully informed. While
those investors obviously have an interest in the tender offer, two other
interested groups are often neglected as deserving of consideration: the
shareholders and creditors of the offeror.10 If the bidder is another business
entity, its investors and creditors supply at least a portion of the capital and
other consideration needed to acquire the tendered shares. If the potential

96. ILL.

REV. STAT.

ch. 121-1/2, §§ 137.57.C, D.

97. Id.
98. ILL.

REV. STAT.

ch. 121-1/2, §§ 137.57.A, B.

99. Although the offering of lower bid prices or a reduction in the number of tender offers
made have not been firmly established by any authoritative studies to date, these concerns are
commonly mentioned and assumed to exist by both commentators and the courts.
100. The market value of the investor's holdings initially will rise. Speculators will purchase
the target company stock to obtain the premium, the difference between the market and the
tender prices per share, when these shares are tendered to the bidder. The effect of these
purchases is to raise the market value of the target company stock; yet any delays may cause
the demand for the target stock to level off or even decline. If the investor does not act quickly
enough, he will not be able to realize any economic benefits associated with this increased
market price. In some instances, however, a tender offer may cause a price decline as investors
react to the proposed change in corporate control by selling off their shares rather than tendering
the shares to the offeror.
101. Greene & Junewicz, A Reappraisalof Current Regulation of Mergers and Acquisitions,
132 U. PA. L. REV. 647, 732-37 (1984).
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delays inherent in the state statutes are realized, additional costs are incurred.
The shareholders and creditors of both the target and the bidder will be
paying for the delays. Any revisions of tender offer regulation must include
consideration of the interests of these two affected groups. Although delay
presents problems for investors and bidders alike, some commentators argue
that delay does in fact benefit target company shareholders by creating an
auction market for their shares. The auction market increases the premium
ultimately received by tendering shareholders. 2 Neither side of the delay
question persuaded a majority of the Supreme Court Justices in MITE.
Justice White's plurality opinion on this issue was not widely endorsed by
his fellow Justices as a basis for state law preemption.
Delays, merit hearings and disclosure differences did not suffice as a basis
for holding state laws unconstitutional because of interference with the
objectives and purposes of federal regulation, the third of the Nelson preemption standards. State tender offer statutes do not conflict with the purpose
of the Williams Act even if local management is favored. As one observer
states, "[tihe fact that the state statutes may alter this balance [between
bidder and target] is therefore an inappropriate basis for statutory preemption. Only if state regulation of tender offers conflicts with the true purpose
and objective of the Williams Act-investor protection-should the state
laws be held to be preempted."' 03 Since state statutes share the Williams
Act's investor protection goal, the differences in the way this goal is furthered
by state and federal statutes do not generate sufficient conflict to justify
federal preemption of state tender offer regulations.
2.

The Commerce Clause

The commerce clause'04 gives Congress the power and the responsibility
to regulate interstate commerce while severely limiting the ability of state
governments to regulate the same subject. A state statute having an effect
on commerce will be upheld if it "regulates even-handedly to effectuate a
legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are
only incidental . . . unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly
excessive in relation to the putative local benefits."'' 0 5 Each state regulation
alleged to violate the commerce clause must be examined in light of several
main factors. The first is the extent of state jurisdictional claims. A second
element is the nature of the purpose to be furthered by the regulation. If

102. See, e.g., Note, supra note 76, at 524.
103. Id. at 523-24. The Supreme Court stressed that there must be actual conflict to justify
preemption-while the conflict need not be express or overt, it cannot be merely a potential
conflict. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963).
104. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, provides in pertinent part that "Congress shall have power
*..to regulate Commerce among the several states."
105. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (citing Huron Cement Co. v.
Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 443 (1960)).
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the purpose is one usually deemed legitimate,'10 the statute is one step closer

to acceptability. A third factor is whether interstate commerce is affected
by the state regulation, and if so, the substantiality of the commerce impact.

The analysis finally centers on whether the legitimate state interest outweighs
the effect on interstate commerce, and whether a viable alternative exists

that still protects the state's interests without affecting interstate commerce
to the same extent as does the current regulation.

State jurisdictional claims are the most important element in the commerce
clause analysis of tender offer regulation. As noted earlier, states do not
base jurisdiction upon securities transactions either specifically involving state
residents or occurring solely within state borders. If the state is in fact
seeking to protect residents who are shareholders of a target company, the
most logical way to do so involves premising state regulation upon the
element of state residency or an in-state situs for the transaction. 0 7 In basing
jurisdiction on the formalities of target company incorporation, organization,
or location of assets, the state inadequately addresses the problem of shareholder protection. Instead of safeguarding the target company stockholders,
the state appears to be concerned only with protecting the target company
and thereby also protecting the state's own economy.
The total effect of the additional disclosure, prenotification and filing
duties, and the merit hearings is the sheltering of local management against
the possibility of a tender offer. 08 By severely limiting and regulating takeovers, the state reduces the chances that a takeover bid will be successful.
The state minimizes the risk of a liquidation or relocation of the firm or
its assets, thereby avoiding a loss of jobs and tax revenues.2 9 Protecting the

106. Legitimate state purposes are generally considered to include the so-called "police
powers" which regulate matters concerning the health, safety and general well-being of society.
107. In a 1976 panel discussion of state takeover statutes and new takeover strategies,
Wisconsin's securities commissioner Jeffrey Bartell mentioned his astonishment that
[n]ot one of the [then existing] 23 state takeover laws defines target company
issuers, to which the provision of the laws apply, in terms of the number or
percentage of that company's shareholders located in that state. If the statute is
honestly designed for the protection of persons, it seems to me it must define
target company in those terms, and not in terms of characteristics of the target
company apart from its shareholders.
A.B.A. SEC. CoRP. BANK & Bus. LAW, State Takeover Statutes and New Takeover StrategiesA Panel, reprinted in 32 Bus. LAW. 1459, 1468 (1976-1977) (emphasis'added). Mr. Bartell
concluded that state securities commissioners should prompt legislators to correct the portions
of the tender offer regulations which "represent overreaching, are extraterritorial in effect or
one-sided in application, or are far removed from the objective of providing regulation for the
protection and benefit of state shareholders." Id.
108. Note, supra note 76, at 528. Two distinct rationales support a management-protective
approach. One rationale is that the state is responding to the influence and pressure associated
with a major local industry. These influences may be monetary, such as contributions to political
campaign funds, or personal, such as close friendships between state officials and members of
the industry's management. The second theory is that the state is protecting itself economically.
109. Despite the appealing nature of these justifications for state protection of management,
the isolation of a local economy is contrary to the Supreme Court concept of a unified national
economy. See infra notes 114-15 and accompanying text.
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companies and their shareholders from corporate raiders was, in fact, a
primary argument supporting state and national regulation of tender offers.'0
While economic protectionism benefits the state, it does not necessarily
benefit the target company shareholders, who theoretically are being protected by the state tender offer provisions. Proponents of tender offers as
a corporate control transfer mechanism contend that the potential use of
the tactic keeps company management alert to the needs of stockholders."'
Fearing replacement if an offer is successful, management attempts to forestall bids by dissatisfied investors. In so doing, management constantly
searches for the optimal uses of all resources-human as well as capital and
material. 1 2 Without the threat of a tender offer, managerial performance
3
declines as management loses its fear of being fired.''
Not only does economic protectionism not benefit the shareholders, it
expressly violates the commerce clause as interpreted by the Supreme Court. 4
The pro-management bias of state statutes directly contradicts the Supreme
Court directive that a state cannot economically isolate either itself or its
local corporations from the rest of the nation by hindering prospective tender
offers.' 5 A state infringes upon the sovereignty of other states by claiming
jurisdiction on an extraterritorial basis. Observers fear that by seeking to
protect all corporate shareholders regardless of their residency, state laws
will severely inhibit potential offerors. 16 Fewer tender offers will occur, and
7
shareholders will lose opportunities for a premium for their shares."
The Supreme Court used the potential inhibition of offers, the loss of the
premium for shares, and the reduced efficiency of management as primary
grounds for holding the Illinois takeover act unconstitutional in Edgar v.

110. Jarrell & Bradley, supra note 2, at 380.
111. See, e.g.,
id. at 380-81, 384; Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 83, at 1169-74.
112. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 83, at 1169-75.
113. Id.at 1175.
114. See infra note 115 and accompanying text.
115. Leading examples of the "economic commonality" doctrine include Pike v. Bruce
Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970) (striking down an Arizona law that required a company to
pack its cantaloupes within the state although it was economically more efficient to package
the melons in a neighboring state); Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951) (invalidating
a Madison, Wis., law requiring pasteurization of milk within five miles of city center, on the
grounds that it was a discriminatory law designed to benefit a major local industry at the
expense of interstate commerce); Toomer v. Whitesell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948) (declaring unconstitutional a South Carolina law requiring state-licensed shrimp fishermen to utilize intrastate
packaging facilities).
116. See generally Note, supra note 2. It is extremely difficult to document whether these
fears were justified because it is difficult to ascertain what factors were instrumental in decisions
of whether or not to proceed with a tender offer. The Supreme Court, however, accepts the
underlying argument of potential inhibition of offers. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624,
642 (opinion of White, J.).
117. The premium is the difference between the stock's per share market value and the price
offered by the bidder. As a general rule, this premium should be about 20% of the market
price. See Hayes & Taussig, supra note 82.
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MITE Corp."8 By blocking nationwide tender offers, the Court stated, the
Act also interfered with the efficiency of the marketplace," 9 since the process
of reallocating economic resources to their highest valued use was substantially impeded.' 20 The combination of economic elements led the Supreme
Court to declare that the burdens placed on interstate commerce by the
Illinois law were substantial.' 2'
Justice White expressed concern that the Illinois act could be applied to
regulate tender offers that involved no Illinois shareholders. If Illinois was
allowed to impose such controls, he reasoned, other states could follow suit,
resulting in a cumulative suppression of securities transactions based upon
tender offers because of the difficulties associated with meeting the requirements of each state's statute. 22 Noting that the commerce clause precludes
the application of a state regulation to commercial transactions occurring
entirely outside of that state's territory, 23 Justice White concluded that since
the Illinois act purported to "regulate directly and to interdict interstate
commerce, including commerce wholly outside the State, it must be held
invalid.... ,,,24 The Court declared the Illinois law unconstitutional on com2 5
merce clause grounds.
Just as the Supreme Court in MITE was concerned over the extraterritoriality of regulation, so too was the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in
Great Western United Corp. v. Kidwell. 26 Idaho's securities commissioner
invoked the takeover law where only two percent of the company's shareholders were state residents. The court declared that the claimed state interest
in protecting shareholders, while legitimate, was weakened by the law's
extraterritoriality because "Idaho has little reason to protect the large majority of shareholders affected by the takeover act."'' 27 The court also noted

118. 457 U.S. 624, 643 (1982) (citing Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 83, at 1173-74). See
also Fischel, Efficient Capital Market Theory, the Market for Corporate Control, and the
Regulation of Cash Tender Offers, 57 TEx. L. REv. 1, 5, 27-28, 45 (1978).
119. The efficient capital market theory states that it is impossible to make abnormal stock
market gains by identifying and trading in mispriced stocks because as information about a
firm reaches a market the price of that firm's stocks will immediately adjust in response to
the news. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 83, at 1165-66.
120. Resource reallocation in the tender offer context means that the offeror will change his
usual capital structure so that there is sufficient cash and other consideration available to
complete the offer. This in turn means that by accepting the offer, the shareholder changes
how his resources are allocated. Instead of two separate "accounts" labelled "cash" and
"company A stock," the investor now has a larger balance in the cash "account" and no
balance in the "company A stock" "account." Through the making and accepting of a tender
offer, both parties immediately involved are able to shift their resources according to their own
preferences. See generally Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 83.
121. MITE, 457 U.S. at 643.
122. Id. at 642 (White, J., by implication).
123. Id. at 643 (citing Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 775 (1945) and Shaffer
v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 197 (1977)).
124. Id. at 643.
125. Id.
126. 577 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1978).
127. Id. at 1285.
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that the purported benefits to investors resulting from the state law 28 were
not assured. The Idaho statute did not guarantee any benefits, and the court
stated it was quite possible that the potential delays could actually harm the
investors.' 29
State claims of extraterritorial jurisdiction present another problem: several
states may assert control over a proposed tender offer. This nearly happened
in MITE, where initial lawsuits were filed in Pennsylvania and Illinois. Since
there is a strong possibility that takeover regulations differ, the offeror risks
violating provisions of one state's law while attempting to satisfy the provisions of another. The complex web of competing state statutes "mak[es]
compliance difficult, if not impossible even for the best-intentioned offeror." 30 A solution to this problem does exist: limiting the claimed basis
of state jurisdiction. Defining the law in terms of the investors and not in
terms of the target company alone would limit the overly broad jurisdictional
claims, while also lessening the impact of the state law upon interstate
commerce."a ' A lesser commerce clause impact would allow states to continue
regulating tender offers without facing problems of constitutionality.
The constitutionality issue raises doubts concerning the proper manner of
regulating tender offers; these doubts relate as well to the regulation of other
methods used to acquire control over a target company. The next sections
of this Note examine the recommendations of an advisory group established
by the SEC to investigate the techniques of control acquisition, focusing
specifically on the suggestions concerning state and federal regulation of
tender offers.

III. ADVISORY COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATIONS
A.

Committee Establishment and General Guidelines

Several well-publicized recent takeover attempts'3 2 together with the MITE'33
and KidwelP34 decisions prompted the public and the securities industry tb

128. Benefits often claimed to result from the operation of state tender offer laws include
additional time for the investor to consider the proposal because of the delays inherent in the
laws; a better-informed decision because of additional disclosure; and a higher tender price
resulting from the competing bid of a "white knight" (a competing bidder sought out by the
target company management). For a discussion of the adverse effects of delay, see supra notes
95-103 and accompanying text.
129. Kidwell, 577 F.2d at 1285.
130. E. ARANow, H. EINHORN & G. BERI.STEIN, supra note 73, at 228.
131. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
132. The two most prominent tender offers were the 1981 attempted takeover of Marathon
Oil Company by Mobil Corporation, and the unsuccessful 1982 effort by the Bendix Corporation
to acquire Martin Marietta Corporation. Both attempts led to litigation claiming violations of
the Williams Act. See Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d 366 (6th Cir. 1981); Martin
Marietta Corp. v. Bendix Corp., 549 F. Supp. 623 (D. Md. 1982). The tender offer strategy
backfired in the Bendix-Martin Marietta battle; through a skilled use of the "Pac-Man" defense,
Martin Marietta made a successful tender offer for Bendix stock, acquiring control of the latter
company.
133. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
134. Great Western United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1978).
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question the purpose and effectiveness of dual registration. The SEC decided
that a full-scale review of existing federal tender offer legislation was needed.
On February 25, 1983, SEC Chairman John R. Shad established an eighteenmember advisory committee to examine current regulations and to suggest
any improvements necessary for the smooth functioning
of tender offers
35
within the context of a national securities market.
The Advisory Committee determined that various techniques of acquiring
corporate control were interrelated, so that regulation of one method without
considering the resultant impact on other methods would be haphazard and
problematic.'36 The Committee therefore decided to examine the entire range
of acquisition techniques, 317 as well as the relationship of state and federal
takeover legislation. The Committee also considered the interaction of federal
138
tender offer statutes with other federal regulatory goals and systems.
B. Recommendations and Analysis
The desirability of tender offers per se has been hotly debated since the
passage of the first tender offer statutes. Proponents argue that threats of
a tender offer stimulate management to continually reevaluate its actions in
light of the shareholders' best interests. Opponents view the entire takeover
process as detrimental to the shareholders, since management expends a vast
amount of its time and the firm's resources to oppose a bid. These critics
fear that the successful bidder will strip the firm of its valuable assets,
causing the company to collapse and thereby leaving the shareholders with
39
worthless stock. '
Not surprisingly, the Committee left the issue unresolved, finding no
indication that tender offers were either inherently beneficial or detrimental
to the investors. The Committee examined the interplay between the national
economy and the national securities markets, implicitly endorsing tender
offers as tools for acquiring corporate control. "Such transactions and
related activities are a valid method of capital allocation so long as they are
conducted in accordance with the laws deemed necessary to protect the
interest and the integrity and efficiency of the capital markets."1 40 The
Committee thus reaffirmed the importance of investor protection, while
emphasizing the importance of the capital markets-national economy link.
After approving the Williams Act's neutrality towards targets and offerors,
the Committee announced several general principles for regulating takeovers.

135. SEC Release No. 34-19528, 48 Fed. Reg. 9111 (1983).
136. Advisory Committee Report, supra note 17, at 1 (Appendix B).
137. Id.
138. Id. These other regulatory systems include antitrust, taxation, banking and credit regulation, and the traditionally regulated industries such as utilities, insurance companies, and
financial institutions.
139. See Jarrell & Bradley, supra note 2, at 380.
140. Advisory Committee Report, supra note 17, at 9 (emphasis added).
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Recognizing that tender offers occur in a nationwide market, the Committee
called for no undue restriction of innovative techniques so that regulation
could respond rapidly to changing market conditions. 14' More important,
however, is the Committee's recommendation that states restrict their regulatory efforts to local companies alone. 42 This is not a new suggestion; the
same proposal was made by the SEC to Congress in 1980. 41
The term "local," however, remains undefined. The Committee suggested
a possible definition could include:
Companies with more than 50%70 of the voting shares held within the
state of incorporation, no listing on a national securities exchange, aggregate market value of voting stock held by non-affiliated stockholders
of $20 million or less, and annual trading volume of such stock less than
one million shares.'"
There are no reasons given for selecting these particular limitations; state
and federal legislators thus are given no real guidelines for revising their
respective regulations. For this reason alone, the guidelines deserve further
examination.
Some elements of the attempted definition are useful. The absence of a
national securities exchange listing in particular would be influential in determining that the firm is a local entity subject to state takeover provisions,
since it would indicate how widely held the stock is and where the majority
of the firm's stockholders reside. A national listing supports the inference
that shareholders are not concentrated in a particular state, thus reducing
the basis for any one state to claim jurisdiction over the tender offer.
A twenty million dollar ceiling on aggregate market value and a limit of
one million shares in annual trading volume may be too high for a local
company not nationally listed. Although the rationale is not specifically
stated, the Committee may have set the aggregate market value ceiling
purposefully high to counter the effects of inflation; rising market rates in
general will not require continual revision of the regulations. There is no
specific rationale to support the high annual trading volume ceiling, other
than a general hypothesis that states should have some role in regulating
tender offers. A trading volume limit of one million shares will enable states
to reach the outer limits of their permissible regulatory activity by exercising

141. Id. at 15-17, Recommendations 3-6 & 8. The Committee also decided that the scope of
tender regulation should be broad enough to protect the shareholders and other market participants from non-disclosure of relevant information, fraudulent practices, and "the creation
of situations in which a significant number of reasonably diligent small shareholders may be
at a disadvantage to market professionals." Id. at 17, Recommendation 7.
142. Id. at 17, Recommendation 9(a).
143. SECURIIaES AND EXCiANGE CoamussioN, Legislative Proposals on Tender Offers, Beneficial Ownership, Issuer Repurchases, 542 SEc. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) I (Special Supp. Feb.
27, 1980). Under this proposal, local companies are defined as those firms with the principal
place of business within the state and with over 50% of the shareholders holding more than
50% of the company's outstanding stock residing in that state.
144. Advisory Committee Report, supra note 17, at 17 n.17.
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jurisdiction over companies with minimal interstate connections. The figures
suggested by the Committee, with the exception of the percentage of resident
shareholders, 45 are adequate measures of a company's interstate or local
nature.
Another important Committee recommendation is that federal takeover
legislation should not override or preempt state corporation law except as
necessary to eliminate abuses or interference with the intended functioning
of the federal provisions.' 46 In the aftermath of the Kidwell and MITE
decisions, states may attempt to justify their takeover laws under the "internal
affairs" doctrine, which asserts that the states alone have the responsibility and the authority to regulate the manner in which firms conduct
business, as well as how the firms relate to their shareholders. 47 Taken
literally, the Committee's suggestion would permit any state tender offers
enacted as part of the state's corporation laws to stand as valid exercises of
state legislative and jurisdictional authority.' 48 The only distinction between
valid and invalid state tender offer regulations would thus be the positioning
of the laws as either a general corporations statute or a blue sky regulation.
Yet this distinction is quite misleading, in view of the Supreme Court's
analysis in MITE. The essential element is not where the statute appears;
rather, it is the impact of that statute upon interstate commerce which
determines the statute's constitutionality. It is this fundamental concept that
is restated in the Committee's suggestion of limited federal preemption of
state corporation law. This suggestion therefore serves only to emphasize
the principles currently guiding the courts as they decide the validity of state
takeover legislation. No federal legislative action is needed on this point,
nor is any expected.
IV.
A.

ALTERNATrvE APPROACH: BoRRowiNG FROM
THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933

The Intrastate Offering Exemption of
Section 3(a)(11) and Rule 147

An alternate method of defining a local company for tender offer purposes
4
is the adoption of criteria used in Rule 147 of the Securities Act of 1933.' 1
Rule 147 provides objective standards for securities issuers wishing to use
the registration exemption allowed for intrastate securites offerings under
145. See supra text accompanying note 22; see also supra note 107 and accompanying text.
146. Advisory Committee Report, supra note 17, at 18, Recommendation 9(b).
147. This doctrine, typically used in resolving choice of law problems, was discussed by the
Supreme Court in MITE, 457 U.S. at 645.
148. This approach has been advocated by some commentators. See Profusek & Gompf,
State Tender Legislation After MITE: Standing Pat, Blue Sky or CorporationsLaw Concepts?,
7 Coap. L. REv. 3, 20 (1984).
149. 17 C.F.R. § 230.147 (1985).
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section 3(a)(l i) of the 1933 Act. 50 A cost basis and a sufficiency argument
together form the rationale for the exemption. In theory, the exemption
allows smaller businesses to raise capital quickly by expediting the expensive
and time-consuming registration procedures.' 5 ' Since many intrastate companies do not command the resources of companies that deal on a national
level, these smaller entities can afford neither the legal and financial expertise
necessary to prepare the registration and disclosure forms nor the time
required to complete the forms and await a response from the SEC regarding
disclosure adequacy.
A second reason for supporting the enactment of the section 3(a)(11)
exemption was that the state securities commissioner is in a better position
to exercise control over the issuer than is the SEC, since more is known
about local investors and important local issues. The state official also is
able to respond more quickly should a situation require immediate atten"' Legislative history reinforces the
tion. 52
claim that existing state securities
regulations were sufficient to handle intrastate securities offerings. When
the exemption was proposed, there was criticism concerning the nonuniformity of state laws and the uneven application of these laws to interstate
offerings. There was, however, no specific criticism directed to state regulation of intrastate securities transactions, 53 and thus no perceived need for
federal regulation of intrastate securities transactions.
Rule 147 considers several factors in formulating objective guidelines for
a section 3(a)(l1) exemption. The place of the issuer's incorporation or
organization and the location of the company's principal office or place of
business are two important elements. 54 Both reinforce the nature of the
issuer as a local entity and serve to partially establish the basis for state
exercise of jurisdiction under blue sky laws.
Case law prior to the adoption of Rule 147 resulted in contradictory and
often confusing definitions for the "doing business within" requirement of
section 3(a)(11). Rule 147 resolves this ambiguity by employing an "eighty
percent test" to determine whether the issuer is in fact doing business within
150. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(11) (1982). Section 3(a)(11) gives only general standards:
the provisions of this title shall not apply to . . . [a]ny security which is part
of an issue offered and sold only to persons resident within a single State or
Territory, where the issuer of such security is a person resident and doing business
within, or if a corporation, incorporated by and doing business within, such State
or Territory.
Id.
151. Alberg & Lybecker, New SEC Rules 146 and 147. The Nonpublic and IntrastateOffering
Exemptions from Registrationfor the Sale of Securities, 74 COLUM. L. RE,. 621, 622 (1974);
Comment, SEC Rule 147-DistillingSubstance from the Spirit of the IntrastateExemption,
79 DiCK. L. REv. 18, 19 (1974).
152. Comment, A New Approach to the IntrastateExemption: Rule 147 vs. Section 3(a)(11),
62 CALIF. L. REv. 195, 198 (1974).
153. Emens & Thomas, The IntrastateExemption of the Securities Act of 1933 in 1971, 40
U. CIN. L. REv. 779, 781 (1971).
154. 17 C.F.R. § 230,147(c)(1) (1985). The two locations may, but need not, be the same.
It is possible that a firm may incorporate in one jurisdiction for special tax or corporate privilege
reasons, yet have its principal office or place of operations located in another jurisdiction.
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the state. Under this test, if a minimum of eighty percent of gross revenues
come from in-state operations, at least eighty percent of total corporate
assets are located within the state, and at least eighty percent of the net
offering proceeds are intended to be (and actually are) used within the state,
5
then the issuer is deemed to be doing business within the state.'
The eighty percent figures have been criticized as being unrealistically high.
It has been suggested that this exemption has been transformed from one
intended to assist large numbers of local businessmen to one that in actuality
aids very few. 5 6 Most complaints pertain to the requirement that eighty
percent of total revenues be locally derived. "It is rare in this age of multistate
business operations to find a company with such a high percentage of
'5 7
revenues derived from activities within a single state.'
Noting that often a "truly local" company conducts a large amount of
interstate business, one writer stated:
Confining their activities almost entirely to the state of residence or
incorporation is contrary to the plain meaning of section 3(a)(11) and
conflicts with the policies of its authors. The revenue provision also
discriminates against issuers organized under the laws of smaller and less
populous states who [need] a certain amount of interstate business to
survive."'
While the Rule 147 standards have been criticized for the arbitrariness of
the figures selected, there are still sound reasons to use them. Partial adoption
of the Rule 147 standards is a starting point in improving tender offer
regulations. The problems associated with current Rule 147 criteria can be
corrected as these standards are tailored to the requirements of the tender
offer process. There is less of a chance of surprise in the application of a
new tender offer rule based on the Rule 147 criteria. In addition, a partial
adoption of these criteria will increase the integration of the 1933 Act with
the 1934 Act, 5 9 thus simplifying and easing the regulatory burdens imposed
by federal securities laws.
Borrowing from the Rule 147 standards presents a philosophical difficulty,
however, in that the rationale supporting Rule 147 differs from that of the
tender offer regulatory scheme. Rule 147 was intended to aid the local issuer,
who is already sufficiently regulated by state blue sky laws, and about whom
a large amount of information is already known. The rationale for adapting
intrastate offering exemption criteria for tender offer regulation purposes,
in contrast, is to construct a constitutionally acceptable basis for the exercise

155. Id. § 230.147(c)(2)(i)-(iv).
156. See generally Alberg & Lybecker, supra note 151; Cummings, The IntrastateExemption
and the Shallow Harbor of Rule 147, 69 Nw. U.L. Ray. 167 (1974); Comment, supra note
152; Comment, supra note 151.
157. Cummings, supra note 156, at 191.
158. Id. at 192.

159. This increased integration results from the use of uniform standards of disclosure to meet
the requirements of both Acts.
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of state jurisdiction over tender offers. Yet the underlying theme is the same
for both regulatory schemes: protection of current and potential investors
by ensuring that full information is readily available to the investor without
strangling desirable transactions in a noose of needless regulation. Differing
aspects of the common problem are addressed by Rule 147 and the Williams
Act. The fact that there are other considerations involved should not automatically render the provisions of the former regulation unavailable for
use in revising the latter.
B.

Refining the Rule 147 Criteria

If the SEC were to adopt the gross revenue-total assets-use of funds
test as a means of defining "local" for tender offer purposes, the percentage
levels used should be lower than those of the intrastate exemption. It is not
clear, however, that the fifty percent figure mentioned by the Advisory
Committee for determining shareholder residency would be any more desirable. It is possible that a potential target company, not necessarily local in
nature, will, immediately upon hearing the first rumors of a tender offer,
attempt to meet the minimum level needed for state protection. A lower
figure is obviously easier to attain than a higher one. If successful, this
action would circumvent the ideas of neutrality towards both bidder and
target as well as exclusive state control over tender offers and takeover
battles involving a local company. A figure in the range of fifty-five to sixtyfive percent for assets and revenues would allow states to regulate those
companies which are truly local and still not intrude into the free flow of
interstate commerce by blocking tender offers.
Even if a figure between fifty-five and sixty-five percent is used to define
"local," there is still the question of burdening interstate commerce. The
new limit arguably burdens interstate commerce; if however, the same number is used to define the company in terms of stockholders who are state
residents, the problems of states claiming extraterritorial jurisdiction would
be greatly reduced. A careful reading of the Supreme Court holding in MITE
shows that extraterritoriality was the essential element: Illinois was claiming
the authority to protect residents of other states.60 Limiting a state's jurisdiction to companies with well over fifty percent of their shareholders residing
in the state makes claims of state regulation to protect resident investors
more credible. This in turn raises the status of the state's legitimate interest
in safeguarding its citizens, reducing the disparity between the impact of the
law on interstate commerce and the valid purpose behind the state takeover
regulation.

160. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 643-46 (1982); see also notes 118-25 and accompanying text.
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V.

SHOULD THERE BE STATE REGULATION

oi LOCAL CoMPANY TENDER OFFERS?

A final consideration is whether there is a need for a definition of a local
company and the restriction of state regulation to tender offers for local
companies. Judging from the extent of tender offer statutes, state legislators
perceive the Williams Act as inadequately protecting their constituents. State
interest generally centers on three areas: protection of investors, protection
of "noninvestor constituencies" such as employees and suppliers,' 6' and
regulation of rapid changes of corporate control. The Indiana General Assembly embraced the investor protection rationale in emphasizing the need
for more disclosure as a tool for decisionmaking, noting that often the
relatively small shareholders lose the benefits of the takeover offer as well
as their equity position in the company. 62 Ohio legislators stressed the effects
on shareholders of rapid changes in corporate control, and the lack of
"normal corporate approval mechanisms" associated with other acquisition
63
techniques as necessitating state regulation of the process.
The SEC Advisory Committee approached the transfer of control problem
from a different angle. In Recommendation 33,' 64 the Committee endorsed
a combination of state corporate laws and the business judgment rule as the
general framework for corporate decisions relevant to takeovers. 165The Committee, however, rejected the state statutes and regulations restricting the
ability of a firm to make a tender offer, citing the interstate commerce
grounds of the MITE holding. 66 Statutes requiring the approval of target
company shareholders prior to the completion of a tender bid were specifically mentioned by the Committee as violating the prohibition against undue
restrictions of interstate commerce. Shareholder approval, rejected by the
Committee, is one of the most frequently used "normal corporate approval
mechanisms" cited by the Ohio legislature in its takeover statute.
As a general rule, it seems unlikely that many tender offers intimately
involving large numbers of a particular state's residents would actually occur.
As the court of appeals pointed out in Kidwell,
the business realities of tender offers make it unlikely that there will be
many offers for corporations held predominantly by Idahoans (or citizens
of any other narrow geographic area). Investment bankers know that
local owners are characteristically loyal to management. Therefore, corporations with widespread stock ownership are more promising tender
offer targets.' 67

161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
IND. CODE § 23-2-3.1-0.5 (1982).
OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 1701.832(A)(2) (Page 1985).
Advisory Committee Report, supra note 17, at 34.
Id.
Id.at 34 n.31; see also id. at 35, Recommendation 34.
Great Western United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256, 1283 (5th Cir. 1978).
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Under this reasoning, tender offers as a means of acquiring corporate control
will be a phenomenon generally associated with large multistate corporations.
These corporations will, by definition, be regulated under the Williams Act;
thus, state takeover laws will be of limited use to a company facing a tender
offer.
Assuming that adequate controls already exist, from either the business
realities mentioned in Kidwell,61 the tendency of investors to act when they
perceive action will be both affordable and effective, 69 or the greater impact
of state regulations upon smaller companies, there is no real need to carve
out a separate tender offer area reserved for state legislative action. The
thrust of MITE and Kidwell is that a state's jurisdiction cannot exceed its
boundaries, nor can the state hinder interstate commerce. As tender offers
are usually associated with large companies held by multitudes of investors,
very few of whom (either in percentage terms or in absolute numbers) are
likely to reside in a certain state, there may be no role for state regulation
of tender offers. This being the case, the Advisory Committee's suggestion
that state takeover statutes be limited to local companies is largely devoid
of significance. Recommendation 9(a) may be simply an exercise in mental
gymnastics, requiring no affirmative action to be taken by Congress or the
SEC.
CONCLUSION

Recent court decisions have pronounced state takeover laws unconstitutional because the overreaching claims of state jurisdictions adversely affect
the making of tender offers. Conflicting state legislation hinders bidders in
their efforts to comply with mandated disclosure and often requires preeffective notification provisions as preliminary steps to making takeover bids
on a nationwide basis. Delays resulting from the operation of state statutes
are costly to all involved as a result of lost opportunities, high fees for legal
and financial expertise, possible reductions of initial bids, assets expended
on pursuing or defending from a tender offer, and a strong likelihood that
some offerors will be discouraged from making bids in the first place. The
Advisory Committee examined the role of state takeover regulation but failed
to do more than repeat the broad themes espoused in MITE and Kidwell.
If the SEC or Congress decides that the Williams Act should specifically
preempt state tender offer laws, or expressly limits such state regulation to
local companies, state jurisdictional claims must be more narrowly tailored
to reduce the adverse impact of state tender offer regulations upon interstate
commerce. The criteria for the intrastate offering exemption of the Securites
Act of 1933 are useful in defining the scope of the state's role in regulating
tender offers.
PHYLLIS

168. Id. at 1283.
169. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 83, at 1170-71.
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